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Abstract. As many industries shift towards centralised controlled information systems for 
monitoring and control, more importance is being placed upon technologies such as 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisitions industrial systems (SCADA).  This focus on 
integration and interoperability presents numerous challenges for security personnel and 
organisational management alike. It becomes paramount therefore to reciprocate this new 
direction within an organisation with adequate plans and frameworks that ensure protection 
and security of its SCADA architecture. A clear understanding of the relevant threats and 
vulnerabilities is critical for adopting/developing appropriate policy and frameworks. To this 
end, in this research we identify and analyse relevant SCADA security threats and 
vulnerabilities and present a simple scheme to classify them for better understanding. 
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1. Introduction 
It is recognised globally that the convergence between Information Technology (IT) and Operations 
Technology (OT) or Industrial Control Systems (ICS) environment(s), is blurring both functional and 
operational boundaries within organisations, be this through technological or organisational change. 
This current day tendency on interoperability and integration between networks often is intended to 
provide organisational capabilities for real-time optimization of business processes, attempting to 
bolster corporate efficiency, competitiveness and organisational productivity. A focal point to this is 
the consolidation of organisational data, so as to provide integrated enterprise information 
management ensuring that the best possible decision can be made from the right information, in the 
right format, to the right person, at the right time. This presents a fundamental dilemma between 
resources that are and have been divergent since inception; as such the criticality of the OT 
environment cannot be underestimated to an organisation, in particular the protection of embedded 
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) software systems which, due to intricacies, 
provide a challenging situation for management and security [5, 11, 13]. This convergence dictates the 
need for a more thorough and formulated approach in the management of inherent risks. The premise 
of our current research is to investigate the SCADA security threats and vulnerabilities and introduce a 
simple scheme to classify them for clearer understanding. In effect, the point of classification is to 
inform the process of adoption/development of appropriate policy and framework for risk 
management. At an operational level, it can be also used to properly communicate to relevant staff and 
business leaders where there is an area of risk that requires attention. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly explains the inherent generational 
weaknesses of SCADA systems. An analysis of SCADA security threats and vulnerabilities are 
  
 
 
 
 
presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce the scheme for classification of SCADA security 
threats and vulnerabilities and finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.  
2. SCADA systems: The inherent weaknesses 
The core purpose of the OT or ICS environment is to deliver a setting for collective real-time control, 
sensing and monitoring capabilities as part of the service operations processes across an organisation. 
The ICS environments typically can be considered fault tolerant and tend to rely on layered 
configuration, whereby data traverses a series of layers between devices and sensors in the field and 
those that are used to control those devices [2, 3]. The strategic importance of ICS or SCADA related 
systems, and how these contribute to a functioning society cannot be emphasised enough. The 
spectrum of applications and functions that are delivered across the globe, can in essence be 
considered at the heart of many things, we take for granted; for example: electricity, water and gas 
transmission and distribution to various public and private industrial process monitoring [4]. 
For the first and second generation of SCADA systems, implementation focal point was purely from 
an operational perspective, failing to account for security aspects during the process. Therefore, by 
leveraging the fundamental nuances associated within the systems, including proprietary 
software/protocols or dedicated communication paths to devices, in combination with minimal 
network technological adoption and isolation or the ‘air gap’ re-affirmed an organisation’s belief that 
there system was secure [2, 15 ]. Security through obscurity can also be considered a primary aspect of 
both generations of systems. With regards to current day systems, the distinction between physical and 
logical independence from corporate networks can be considered the fundamental flashpoint. With the 
reliance on open source technologies and common protocols, not to mention the focus on 
organisational interoperability, the SCADA or ICS environment now contains much of the same 
flexibility as an IT environment, as well as the potential drawbacks associated with increased 
interconnectivity and potential vulnerabilities [1, 5, 6]. Systemically this is at the heart of many of the 
security concerns facing management and security professionals. These environments differ 
architecturally and also the management and possible repercussions of a successful attack are radically 
different. Table 1 summarises the key generational weaknesses of SCADA systems. 
 
Table 1. Generational weaknesses of SCADA systems 
SCADA 
Generation 
Time Period Weaknesses 
1st Generation 1960s The inherent weakness of this generations include: 
• Co-location of server and users. 
• Built on Mainframe Technologies; if mainframe becomes unavailable the 
so does the SCADA abilities. 
• Reliance on proprietary software and protocols on dedicated paths to 
devices. 
• ‘Security through Obscurity’, and protection through isolation or ‘Air 
Gap’. 
 
2nd Generation 1980s Incorporating the many of the weaknesses from 1st Generation, further 
weaknesses include: 
• Limited geographical extent.  
• Technologically reliant on evolving network technologies. 
• Communication protocols could be easily read and understood. 
 
Current Day >2000 to 
present 
These include:  
• Built on open standards and architecture, moving away from proprietary 
standards. 
• Fundamental reliance on network technologies and connectivity. 
• Interconnection and interoperability between corporate and SCADA 
networks. 
• Utilisation of web technologies opens organisation to cyber-attacks. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Security threats and vulnerabilities: An analysis 
Not unlike conventional ICT related systems, SCADA systems face many security threats and 
vulnerabilities. This section attempts to identify and analyse them, while providing a simple 
classification mechanism in Section 4, which avoids any ambiguity. Similarly to [2], fundamental 
security differences will be highlighted, alluding to the elementary security aspects that compared to 
the IT environment are often accepted risks due to the importance of that component or device. 
Between out-dated Operating Systems, inability to arrange downtime, compatibility or concerns over 
the lasting impact of an applied patch, the ICS environment does offer a peculiar set of security risks 
for professionals to adapt too. 
Elaborated within NIST Risk management guide, a threat source can be considered the concurrence of 
an actor’s interaction and motivation. Establishing a taxonomy of threat source, they break this down 
into four overarching categories: Adversarial, Accidental, Structural and Environmental [7, 12]. This 
definition is centred on actions taken by an actor or threat agent, be this with malicious intent or not. 
Many of the threat sources facing SCADA systems are built upon the generational weaknesses 
elaborated in the previous section. These foundations provide substantial opportunity for attack 
vectors from multiple areas. However despite these, outside generational weaknesses, supplementary 
threat sources continue to be discovered and built upon. 
3.1. Common threats and vulnerabilities 
The most glaring common aspect that has led to numerous threat sources, which is rarely furthered in 
discussions, can be considered the divide that exists between Information Technology and SCADA 
related teams, be this political, cultural or technical. Historically separate as discussed, the emergence 
of organisational and business drivers forcing this cohesion, has often led to disparate and an 
environment that is segmented with no demarcation between operational duties. This incongruence is 
obvious with the differing mentality with regards to SCADA systems, in particular as seen by SCADA 
operators, the threat to safety and continuity of the process, far outweighs the application of IT 
security technologies [10]. 
The increasing interconnectivity and integration of SCADA systems has also amplified the exposure 
of the network to a greater number of access points, this not only provides the need for greater 
understanding but compounds the complexity of the environment with a greater number of subsystems 
that have interconnections between each other [8, 9]. This further makes redundant the older security 
beliefs of ‘air gap’ or security through obscurity, and disconnection from internet. 
Technologically, the threat sources faced via the use of common computing technologies makes 
SCADA systems susceptible to many of their inherent weaknesses. It is not uncommon for legacy 
systems to be operating side by side with modern solutions, with both of these rarely under patch 
management. This coupled with the implementation of these systems  often being based  upon a ‘set 
and forget’ mentality, whereby factory standard settings or default passwords are left as part of the 
installation, has resulted in many SCADA systems operating a variety of hardware and software 
configurations, some of which are no longer supported but are critical for operational functionality. 
This is further hindered operationally due to the inability to make changes which would breach 
contractual obligations or vendor warranty specification. In effect, due to the inability for vendors to 
remain and guarantee a technology, current upgrade path opens up many situations for manipulation or 
exploitation by multiple threat sources. The ability to disable security settings for ease of installation 
and usability also should be considered as a configuration option that is lightly used. 
This leads to a failure by most SCADA system owners to actively and continuously apply both system 
wide and system specific configuration management. This critical aspect of security affords an 
organisation to actively monitor and track configurations, thus ensuring that any authorised changes 
are captured and threat sources that have made these changes, are understood.  The lack of security 
and configuration baselines for many of the SCADA systems that exist, really highlights the inability 
to detect abnormal activity. 
  
 
 
 
 
Other common attack vectors that should be considered, as is the case with any form of IT 
Technology include: (i) Online threats including malware, phishing scams etc. (ii) Internal threats. (iii) 
External threats, such as, industrial espionage or ‘hacktivism’. (iv) Mobile storage mediums and 
mobile devices. 
4. Threat and vulnerability classification: A simple scheme 
While classifying SCADA security threats and vulnerabilities, it is best to first assess the risk by 
identify the following: 
 
• Impact (What event would impact the business and to what maximum extent). 
• Actor (Who would exploit this, and for what reason or who could accidentally become the 
trigger for the event). 
• Source or Attack Vector (Where would the exploitation originate). 
• Likelihood (Combines types of vulnerability, such as, physical/logical/technical, and any 
effective mitigation in place. Considering them, what is the likelihood that the event would 
occur within the current environment). 
 
To classify threats and vulnerabilities is therefore a process of using the risk as assessed above and 
then reporting it in the context of both the organisation’s risk appetite and a description of the impact 
to business operations.  To do this effectively one must develop a set of terms that is understood by the 
business. One of the key intents of classification is to properly communicate to relevant staff and 
business leaders, where there is an area of risk that requires attention. For example: You may 
determine, a technical vulnerability exists within the configuration of a system. Then you assess the 
maximum impact of exploiting this vulnerability and the extended failure of the Network Management 
System. You may determine, there is only one attack vector that could exploit that vulnerability and it 
could only happen from inside the network environment. Next, you determine the likelihood of 
occurrence, based on historical industry data. Using these information, you consult the enterprise risk 
register, to assess the risk as HIGH. Now you need to classify the risk in terms of ‘business context’. 
For example: ‘There is a HIGH risk causing disruption for scheduled network maintenance work’. 
 
Table 2. Classification of threat/vulnerability sources based on the proposed scheme 
Dimension Physical Logical 
People Incorporates the human related threats 
to the Physical Infrastructure, 
including theft and damage. 
From the logical perspective, SCADA 
security threats in relation to the people 
category; an example of such is insufficient 
access control process in place to verify the 
user issued command. 
 
Process Combines the processes in place, for 
installation, maintenance and 
decommissioning of devices. 
Formulation of the processes. 
 
Network/Integration Covers the Network and Integration at 
a physical level, for example, 
Reliance on network technologies and 
public communication, VPN 
connectivity. 
Fundamentally can be considered one of 
the biggest threats of a SCADA system, 
from threats associated to protocols as well 
as data simplicity. Segregation can also be 
considered a particularly relevant 
component. 
Technical/Technological Comprising of physical technological 
threats; both with historical and future 
perspectives; for example, ageing 
infrastructure could be a historical 
technical threat. 
Covers the technological threats at logical 
layers; for example, out-dated or unpatched 
operating systems or software as well as 
the adoption of internet based technologies. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
This interconnection and focus on interoperability has brought many of the weakness associated with 
the corporate ICT environments without the ability to utilise consistently the solutions that attempt to 
mitigate these, due to functional differences that exist. Moving from isolation to consistent 
connections between organisational systems including MIS (Management Information Systems), CIS 
(Customer Information Systems),  DMS (Distribution Management Systems) and EMS (Energy 
Management Systems), to name a few, and the utilisation of communication technologies and ICT 
technologies have further enabled the potential risks of exploits being applicable. 
Considering the above factors, we introduce the following four dimensions, in order to classify various 
components of threats and vulnerabilities, in the context of SCADA and IT convergence, in a simple, 
yet adequate manner: (i) People, (ii) Process, (iii) Network/Integration and (iv) 
Technical/Technological. As an example, Table 2 presents a classification of the sources of threat and 
vulnerability, based on our proposed scheme. Similar classification is possible for types of threats and 
vulnerabilities, potential control mechanisms and so on. The strength of our proposed scheme is its 
simplicity. 
In this context, it may be noted that our proposed classification scheme is partly influenced by [2], 
where, Cheminod et al. characterised and tabularized system characteristics, typical security practices 
and countermeasures, utilised between corporate and ICS environments, highlighting the fundamental 
discrepancies that exist due to different and overarching intended purposes and design of each 
environment. 
4.1. Moving forward 
The distributed and networked nature of many of the current SCADA systems opens a number of 
possibilities for intrusion through varying communication protocols. These connections have the 
potential to provide greater numbers of access points while increasing system and environment 
complexities [11, 13]. Moving forward, any discussion around the current day SCADA threats and 
vulnerabilities [14, 15] should also include, security issues associated with the use of ICT 
infrastructure and the previous security focus within older generations of SCADA systems. Some 
examples are as follows: 
 
• Openness to electronic attack through the utilisation of and reliance on network technologies. 
(The widening of distribution networks has forced a reliance on public telecommunication 
links for interconnectivity instead of the previous separate links designated for devices.) 
• Interconnection between corporate and SCADA networks. (These linkages to corporate 
information systems, allow for the potential undesirable access to the SCADA network.) 
• The diversity of vendors, in particular the use of common standards. (Although this has 
provided advantages with regards to integration of devices and hardware, the open standards 
and protocols expose SCADA systems to manipulation of these protocols and technologies.) 
• The ageing of equipment and the inability to interact with modern day technologies. 
• Data simplicity and real-time processing. (The very nature of the system, due to exposure, is 
now one of SCADA’s greatest vulnerabilities. Also included is the failure to provide 
confidentiality when transferring data.) 
• The large scale lack of authentication that exists across many SCADA systems, from the use 
of default installation passwords to no passwords at all. (The ability to accurately authenticate 
the user’s identity when performing a function is not always the strongest.) 
 
5. Conclusions 
Securing SCADA environments provides a number of challenges to security practitioners and 
managers alike. The largest deterministic value for this challenge is the inherent nature and disparity 
that commonly exists between SCADA and traditional IT systems. In this paper, we have explored and 
  
 
 
 
 
analysed some of the key SCADA security threats and vulnerabilities and introduced a simple scheme 
for classifying these threats and vulnerabilities to assist adoption of appropriate mitigation strategies.  
Due to the utilisation and application of SCADA or IACS technologies, across a variety of industries, 
not to mention distribution, the difficulty in establishing and utilising an overarching holistic security 
framework should be highlighted.  Internationally, there are a number of agencies, which provide 
advice and recommendations on good practices. The common theme for this seems to be the focus on 
stakeholder involvement, engaging stakeholders in open discussion on the protection of their system, 
in an attempt to address the major concerns facing operators within this area. Industry best practices 
provide assistance to organisations. However, more often the case is that organisations are left to pick 
and choose what they consider applicable to themselves. Fundamentally there is no fault with this 
process. However, if there were more applicable industry specific methodologies, in combination with 
overarching holistic processes, we would find a more integrated security practice that should address 
many of the underlying flaws. The growing awareness has improved security somewhat, over the past 
decade. However without greater engagement and interaction, not just at any national level, but an 
international level, it would be difficult to see a mutually beneficial outcome. 
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